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Corporate Governance in Lebanese Banks: Focus on Board of 
Directors 
 
Bilal Kchouri 
 
Abstract 
 
Banks in Lebanon are the central depository platform of the overall economy’s funds 
and liquid assets. They have worked as a main pillar for the economy over several 
decades before, as well as being essential to attracting and securing foreign 
investments into the country. Given that agency problems and poor governance 
systems have led to many banking problems and money crises across the globe, 
evaluating the status of the banking governance in Lebanon becomes essential to 
identify and mitigate risks, and optimally abide by recognized international standards. I 
aim in this thesis to investigate about the corporate governance practices applied in 
Lebanese banks, and greatly focusing on the Board of Directors structure. The study 
gathers information from 67 operational banks working in Lebanon with physical 
presence in the country. Data used covers almost all the country's banks having 
operated in the current year, whether Lebanese or of foreign ownership. 
Within this framework, we created a Board of Directors Index using ISS scoreboard, 
accessed the available information for banks, linked the findings to the international 
corporate governance standards and compared the scores of BoD with financial 
performance indicators and BvD ownership structure. For further analysis, banks were 
grouped into local and foreign entities and ranked by tiers based on total assets. BoD 
Index is also grouped into three subgroups. 
 
Keywords: Corporate, Governance, Board, Directors, ISS, Banks, Lebanon 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we introduce the notion of corporate governance with concentration 
on banking sector, and then describe the importance of this governance in the banking 
sector in Lebanon and its impact on the Lebanese industries. Finally we describe how 
corporate governance can be measured. 
1.1. Why is the banking governance important? 
 
Banks are considered alternatives to underdeveloped financial markets and play the 
role of the central depository for the economy’s funds. Bank managers have now more 
freedom in managing their banks with the presence of modern liberalized banking 
systems. Chahine and Safieddine (2009) states that “There arises the importance of 
safeguarding the industry in developing countries from systematic failures, which result 
in the majority of cases from governance inefficiencies”. 
In fact, agency problems and poor governance have led to many banking crises and 
failures. The latest financial crisis and various failures in the USA and Europe (i.e., 
Lehman Brothers in USA, Northern Rock in UK, etc.), ensured that having good 
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regulations and well-governed organizations is a must to moderate risk and build 
stable economy. 
The bank has a fiduciary obligation to both depositors and shareholders. Thus, the 
interests of clients, who are attempting to save their money, are different from the 
bank shareholders, who would prefer a further risky asset in seeking a higher return. If 
a bank pursues the interests of its shareholders, it could go for more risk than its 
clients’ need. Therefore, governments have a motivation to protect both bank 
depositors and shareholders by setting regulations to discourage extreme risk and to 
guard the deposit insurance system from moral hazard cruelty by bank administration. 
Banks are also responsible to conserve a well-structured corporate governance system 
that ensures internal system to protect and develop the sector. 
1.2. Why is banking governance important in Lebanon? 
 
In Lebanon, banks are the key source of business financing and they are considered the 
central financial institutions, by means that loans from banks are the key source of 
external finance for business. It is critical to view the real image of this sector in order 
to understand the status of the economy and to improve it accordingly. 
In the case of Lebanon based on The World Bank data, the Lebanese Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) rose from 3.3 Billion USD in 1988 to 44.3 Billion USD in 2013. This 
1242.42% increase in 25 years was accompanied by only 750% increase in annual 
income from 1,000 USD in 1988 to 8,500 USD in 2013. To understand the source of this 
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inconsistency, we have to know that the consumption, government and net exports 
are increasing at a much lower rate than the investment component in Lebanon. The 
banks acquire the biggest investments in Lebanon, thus they are considered the base 
of the monetary growth during the last 25 years. 
According to Banque du Liban (See Appendix A), Lebanon has 67 active banks in 2015 
of which 16 are investments banks. These banks have a total of 1041 branches. Also, 
there are 376 branches of 33 banks outside Lebanon across 33 countries and 85 cities. 
The total assets are USD 175 billion and total deposits are USD 147 billion. Total Credits 
to Private Sector are USD 50 billion and total credit for housing loans and small to 
medium enterprises are USD 116.6 million. According to the Association of Banks in 
Lebanon, banks in Lebanon contribute to 40% of the GDP.  
Regarding human resources, banks in Lebanon have 23,850 employees of which 46.5% 
are female and 74.8% are holders of university degrees.  
The growth of this sector was adopted by the use of advanced technology and expert 
workforce. Lebanese banks were center of attraction for foreign investments especially 
Arabian ones because of the strict secrecy law and the free exchange system. Stable 
monetary system in Lebanon was observed during the financial crisis of 2008. The 
economy and the banking sector in Lebanon were almost not affected in that crisis. 
Central bank governor expressed wise policies and regulations to protect the sector.  
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1.3. How would this impact Lebanese industry? 
 
Lebanese economy is weak and illiquid. After 15 years of civil war, the renaissance of 
the banking sector was crucial in providing the capitals desired to reconstruct the 
republic. The repaired confidence and the movement of external investments 
stimulated a number of foreign banks to reopen their branches in Lebanon. Lebanese 
banks are considered a center of attraction for foreign investments, especially Arabian 
ones because of the strict secrecy law and the free exchange system. Stable monetary 
system in Lebanon was observed during the financial crisis of 2008. The economy and 
the banking sector in Lebanon were almost not affected in that crisis. Central bank 
governor expressed wise policies and regulations to protect the sector.  
After the war, Lebanon benefited from big investments coming from other markets, 
especially the gulf region. This played a big role in refining the economy. These 
investments were going to Lebanon because of the confidential banking system 
supported by the central bank. However, due to many political and regional reasons, 
these investments shifted into other economies were risk rates were considered to be 
less significant. 
In order for the local and foreign banks to gain the confidence of the foreign 
investment, they are asked to apply disclosure system. Lebanese firms are requested 
by law to disclose their financial reporting. However, there is some information that is 
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still not available, such as compensation and corporate governance reporting. The 
voluntary disclosure theorizes that an extended disclosure strategy is a mechanism 
that helps to decrease the asymmetric information between inside directors and 
outside investors. Hence, banks in Lebanon that need additional external financing for 
growth are likely to carry out an expanded disclosure policy which will in return lower 
the cost of external financing. 
When the government is not applying good law enforcement, the foreign investments 
will decrease thus firms will rely more and more on banks. In the absence of good 
regulating government and within the dependence of the economy on the banking 
sector, it becomes very crucial that banks apply a diverse corporate governance that 
ensures monitoring and development. 
The Lebanese legal system was structured around the French legal system, which falls 
between the network-oriented and the market-oriented systems. 
“Unfortunately, the Commercial Code is outdated and does not address many key 
corporate governance issues, and the Beirut Stock Exchange Listing Requirements 
focus on disclosure and accounting issues only.” (Chahine & Safieddine, 2009, p. 4) As a 
result, a lot of main corporate governance zones are not included into the legal 
structure. This factor may results in vulnerable minority shareholders. Lately, corporate 
governance has been recognized as important factor in mending performance, 
especially in private sectors. 
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However, due to the adaptation of good government practices, a number of Lebanese 
banks have progressed in restoring a culture of equity/fairness that was lost during the 
1975-1990 Lebanese civil war and in improving aspects in the legal and institutional 
corporate governance structure. For this reason, Lebanon entered in the low tier of 
emerging markets.  
1.4. How is corporate governance in banks measured? 
 
In 2005, the International Shareholder Service (ISS) organized group attributes to 
measure corporate governance in foreign firms. One can notice each attribute in the 
filings, annual reports, and websites of the firms understudy. For the purposes of this 
thesis, part of the attributes that can be applicable to Lebanese banks was used. A 
numerical score was given for the attained attributes. Each bank will then have a score 
that reflects its level in applying corporate governance. 
The Governance QuickScore is an issuance by the ISS that defines corporate 
governance standards to help researchers and investors evaluate governance risk and 
apply necessary actions. The QuickScore covers more than 5,000 companies including: 
U.S. Russell 3000, Canadian S&P/TSX Composite, MSCI EAFE, STOXX600, NZX15, ASX 
200, and the MSCI EM. The score also covers data in Brazil, Russia, India, China, South 
Africa, and South Korea. 
In calculating each company score, ISS scrutinizes correlations between governance 
attributes and financial indicators. The financial indicators are based on common 
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performance factors that can be classified into four categories: market, profitability, 
liquidation and valuation. 
The corporate governance attributes consist of 200 criteria that reflect corporate 
governance risk. Companies under study are evaluated relevant to their information. 
The company may meet, surpass or fail to attain each relevant attribute. The attributes 
can be grouped into four categories: board structure, compensation/remuneration, 
shareholder rights and audit practices. 
ISS doesn’t declare weights for each attribute. For this reason, the thesis considered all 
attributes have the same weight.  
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter2 presents a literature review of what has 
been studied previously in the banking governance and ISS application. Chapter 3 
defines the methodology of the research. In chapter 4 hypothesizes are developed. 
Chapter5 presents the empirical results, and chapter 6 discusses the final conclusions.  
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Chapter Two 
 
Literature Review 
 
The literature review includes studies done on the subject in USA, EU and third world 
countries. Minor efforts were done in Lebanon regarding corporate governance in 
banking, but worth to be presented. 
2.1. Banking governance in US and EU markets 
 
Prior research found considerable proof that banks with efficient corporate governance 
mechanisms report higher positive income when compared to banks with weak 
governance efficiency. Also, banks that are well-administered involve less in aggressive 
earnings management behavior through using discretionary provisions for loan losses 
and realized security profits and losses (Leventis, Dimitropoulos, &Owusu-Ansah, 
2013).Investors take into account the effectiveness of each bank's corporate 
governance aiming fora better investment decision when returns are not really 
informative. Leventis et al. (2013) asked inspectors to consider reinforcing governance 
mechanisms through new laws or stronger law reinforcement, where earnings 
management is this much, since they are in charge for the acceptable level of 
corporate governance standards. 
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After Leuz, Lins and Warnock (2010), in attempt to assess whether and why concerns 
about corporate governance result in fewer foreign holdings, they 4,409 firms were 
examined from twenty-nine countries. They found out that the firms that are located in 
countries with poor outsider protection and disclosure and have ownership structures 
that are helpful to governance problems don’t attract foreigners to invest in it. This 
action is mainly declared when earnings are opaque, indicating that inconsistency and 
monitoring expenses handled by foreign investors possibly drive the results. Opromolla 
(2008) argued that the new banking Italian regulations force the banks to set up the 
appropriate corporate governance provisions and organized management and control 
devices that aim to back up the risks that they are exposed to.  The new regulatory 
charter spins on the principles presented on corporate governance for banks by Basel 
Committee’s guidance. 
2.2. Corporate Governance in Lebanon 
 
Corporate Governance is a new phenomenon in Lebanon. It enhances a new corporate 
culture a complicated process that consumes long time. There are many obstacles that 
prevent good implementation like dogmatic system and legal weakness. In Lebanon 
the CG awareness is somehow traditional in means of the willingness to create a real 
independent management structure that avoid manager-stockholder conflict. This 
awareness is gradually improving, especially in private sectors and banks. There are 
obstacles that prevent the regulatory system in Lebanon from moving fast.  
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Most of the Lebanese companies are family based and are considered small to medium 
enterprises. Even many banks in Lebanon are essentially family business.   Hence, 
although a reliable CG system can develop a company to lead a constant market 
expansion over the long-term; many companies in Lebanon still rely on managing their 
businesses themselves. They are even unwilling to use business procedures. In 
addition, most of the companies in Lebanon have duality in Chairman and CEO who 
usually is a family member. 
It is noticed throughout previous studies that family businesses in Lebanon does not 
recognize the importance of an independent member on the board of directors. They 
are unwilling to share management with independent party and decision-making 
power with outsider. The information of the company are considered sensitive and not 
to be shared. 
Samia EL Meouchi and Ola Haidar (2009) observed absence of governmental agencies 
responsible for enforcing CG regulations. The only efforts are done by two non-
governmental organizations, the Lebanese Transparency Association (LTA) and the 
Lebanese Corporate Governance Task Force (LCGTF). There are some small law firms 
specialized in corporate governance implementation, but they are still not able to 
expand in the market.  
Regarding the banking sector, Lebanese Central Bank has the authority to apply CG 
principles. However these principles are still finance focused and do not abide by 
international standards. The Banking Control Commission monitor financial reporting 
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of banks and the central bank is eligible to charge penalties and other actions on the 
defaulting banks. 
For example, the central bank is concerned with internal audit in banks. The central 
bank requires all banks to have a management unit in charge of internal audit. The 
internal audit unit is governed through the Core Principles for Evaluating Internal 
Control Systems in Banks set by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision. This unit 
is mandated to be independent from the bank's management. The chief is appointed in 
the board of directors.  
The central bank also asks banks to have Audit Committee driven from the board of 
directors. The committee shall include at least three independent members. One of 
these members at least should acquire financial expertise. The central bank states that 
duty of this committee is to assist BoD in accomplishing audit requirements and 
supervisory tasks. 
Moreover, the LTA and LCGTF enhanced the Lebanese Code of Corporate Governance 
in 2006 to define principles and practices to develop the value of board of directors 
and the performance of the company. This code introduces the fundamentals of 
corporate governance based on multiple international references and good 
governance practices. Although this code is driven by international standards, it is 
modified to meet the Lebanese commercial and legal contexts. The LCGTF issued 
recently amendments to the Code to keep it updated. 
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The LTA and LCGTF worked on providing listed companies with CG code. The problem 
is that corporate governance in Lebanon –except the mentioned case of central bank- 
is applied voluntarily. The code imposes listed companies to abide by clear governance 
procedure. The code is still focused on board of directors and audit. LTA and LCGTF are 
working on other sides of corporate governance for the future. 
The most important objective for them now is to increase awareness of CG in order to 
apply it efficiently. Governmental authorities, financial institutions and different 
companies are requested to invest more in corporate governance. The aim is to protect 
Lebanese industries and attract foreign investments to accelerate economy cycle and 
strengthen financial situation.  
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Chapter Three 
 
Research Methodology 
 
The research methodology used in this thesis is to convert corporate governance and 
ownership structure numerically to be measured and assessed in terms of financial 
performance. 
3.1. Attributes 
 
Attributes contain board of directors index sorted form the ISS Quickscore and 
ownership structure sorted from the Bureau van Dijk Independence Indicator. 
3.1.1. Board of Directors Attributes 
Similar studies used the ISS index to study corporate governance in firms and compare 
it with other factors. Chung, Elderb and Kim (2007) found that companies with 
enhanced corporate governance are barely spread. They have less significant price 
impact of trades. An index with a higher quality market and information-based trading 
is not a choice. They used 24 attributes from the ISS to measure the corporate 
governance in firms. 
Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz and Williamson (2007) constructed a firm-level governance index 
and compared between companies in the US and companies outside the US. They 
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found that only 12.68% of the foreign companies have higher index than US 
companies. To score the governance, Aggarwal et al. used thirty attributes of ISS index 
and applied it to 2,234 firms outside US and 5,296 firms in the US. They settled cross 
country implications and matched the two set of companies. 
This study is similar in its methodology to the studies discussed above. However, this 
thesis focuses on the board of directors in the Lebanese banking system. 
As most of the banks in Lebanon are not listed, the disclosed information was found on 
each bank’s website, financial reports and other publications (proxy statements, 
governance documents, directors and execution compensation, CSR and code of 
ethics). 
Below is the index that was used to measure BoD performance in the bank.(Check to 
include here or in appendix) 
 Bank Name 
 Listed / Unlisted 
 Audit Firm 
 Annual Report Disclosure 
 Board of Directors Existence Disclosure 
 Board of Directors Details Disclosure 
 Audit Committee 
 Nomination and Compensation Committee 
 Corporate Governance Committee 
 Executive Credit Committee 
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 Board Risk Committee 
 Board Executive Committee 
 Board of Directors: Number of members 
 Independent Members on Board 
 Dual Chairman/CEO 
 Average Age of Members 
 Financial Experience of Members 
 Minority on Board 
 Corporate Governance Guidelines 
 Number of Annual Meetings of Board 
 
For each bank under study, we reviewed the available information on the website, 
annual report and corporate governance guidelines. The undisclosed information lead 
to a score of “0” for each attribute in the index. Attributes that cover annual report 
disclosure, board of directors existence, board members’ details disclosure, 
committees, and availability of corporate governance guidelines will have a “1” score 
for a “Yes” answer and a “0” for a “No” answer. 
For audit firm, a score of “1” was given for having one local or international auditor, 
“2” for having an auditor from the Big Four, “3” for having an auditor from the Big Four 
and another local or international auditor, “4” for having two auditors from the Big 
Four. 
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For the number of members on board, a score of “1” was given for banks that have less 
than 7 or greater than 12 members on board. ISS considered board of six members or 
less to be a small one while a board of 12 members and more to be a big one. 
For the board independence, a score of “0” was assigned for the undisclosed 
information or for having no independent member on board, “1” for having one 
independent member, “2” for having less than 50% or greater than 80%, and “3” for 
having between 50% and 80% independent members. ISS considered that a board with 
no majority of independent members raises significant concerns. “Directors with ties to 
management may be less willing and able to effectively evaluate and scrutinize 
company strategy and performance. Furthermore, boards without adequate 
independence from management may have inherent conflicts of interest” (ISS 
Governance Score 2.0, 2014). New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) defines an independent 
director as one who has no material relationship with the company. Based on this 
definition, the board member will be independent if he has not served as an executive 
of the bank, earned compensation greater than $120,000 from the bank, served as an 
internal or external auditor of bank or served as an executive of another bank whose 
business with his/her bank is$1 million or 2% of revenue. 
In case the chairman of BOD is also the CEO, the bank will get “0”. The same score is 
given in case the information is not disclosed. If the Chairman and CEO are two 
different individuals, the bank will get “1”. 
Regarding the average age of the board members, a score of “0” will be given to the 
missing information. A score of “1” is given to the bank where average age is less than 
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50 or greater than 70 years. A score of “2” will be given to the bank where average age 
is between 50 and 70 years. According to Cloyd, directors who are getting old are 
standing back to give a chance for the new generation into the boards. New directors 
on board have decreased to 291 out of 5,184 total director seats in 2012. This presents 
a 27% drop since 2002, according to the 2012 Spencer Stuart US Board Index reports. 
Concurrently, directors’ average age is 68, board term’s average is 8.7 years, and the 
obligatory retirement age ranges between 72 and 75, but all of those rates have arisen. 
“Many proponents of board renewal suggest that a director should be replaced after a 
lengthy tenure since they may not have “fresh” perspectives and because they may not 
be entirely independent.” (Cloyd, 2013) 
For the financial expertise, Zero “0” was given for the bank with no members having 
financial experience or no information about the subject. One “1” was given for boards 
containing less than 50% of members with financial expertise and “2” for boards 
containing more than 50% of members with financial expertise. ISS suggests having on 
board experts in finance, accounting and audit. It’s also recommended that the 
financial expert to be independent. “A member is considered to be financial expert if 
he /she is or was a chief financial Officer, chartered accountant, certified management 
accountant, fellow chartered accountant (FCA), fellow certified practicing accountant 
(FCPA), or partner of an accounting firm” (ISS Governance Score 2.0, 2014). 
“According to some academic and other studies, increasing the number of women on 
boards of directors correlates with better financial performance. Such findings could 
have a significant effect on the nomination of women as corporate officers” (ISS 
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Governance Score 2.0, January 2014).The score “0” was recorded for banks with no 
information on minority members or for banks with no women or different ethnicity on 
board. A score of “1” was given for boards with one minority member and “2” for more 
than one minority member. Statistics show that 16% of board members in USA are 
women. 
Zero “0” was given for banks that have no corporate governance guidelines and “1” for 
banks that have one. 
Zero “0” was given for banks that do not declare number of meetings per year conducted by 
the board of directors. A “1” score was given for banks with less than eight annual meetings 
and “2” for banks that have more than eight. "The average number of annual board meetings 
in USA is 8-9 meetings" (Spencer Stuart, 2009). 
3.1.2. Ownership structure 
A final attribute was used, unrelated directly to the board of directors, but to the 
ownership structure of the bank. For this purpose the reference was the Bureau van 
Dijk Independence Indicator (BvDI). The BvD database is constantly updated and hence 
it comprises the recent structure of shareholder ownership. Bureau van Dijk generated 
an independence indicator in order to illustrate the structure of the shareholders and 
measure its independence. The indicator scores range from an A, B, C, D and to U. 
“A” refers to the “independent companies”. It means that none of the known 
shareholders own more than twenty five percent directly or collectively. According to 
Varekamp, the indicator A can also be further qualified as A+, A and A - : 
A+: Represents companies that have more than 5 stockholders whose ownership 
percentage is known. 
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A: Companies that have 4 or 5 identified shareholders with known ownership 
percentage. 
A-: Companies that have 1 to 3 identified shareholders with known ownership 
percentage. 
“The qualifications “+”or “-” refer to the degree of reliability of the indicator that is 
attributed and not to the degree of independence.” (Varekamp, 2013) 
“B” means that none of the known shareholders own more than fifty percent directly 
or collectively but there are shareholders with ownership that exceeds twenty five 
percent as in “A”. The “B” can be also indicated as B+, B, and B- with the same meaning 
as mentioned above. 
“C” refers to companies that have an ultimate owner where the collective ownership 
exceeds fifty percent. 
“D” refers to companies that have an owner holding more than fifty percent of the 
shares directly. 
“U”is given to companies that have no sufficient information to assess the degree of 
independence. 
In our study, we to plug the numbers in SPSS we considered: 
U: 1 
D: 2 
C: 3 
B: 4 
A-: 5 
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A+: 6 
3.2. Financial Performance Indicators 
 
The banks are classified into two groups. The aim of this classification is to extend our 
analysis abilities. The first group classifies banks referring to their ranking in Lebanon in 
terms of total assets. The second group classifies banks if they are local of regional 
banks acting in Lebanon or international banks having a branch in Lebanon.  
To study results and compare the scores of the board of director’s attributes and the 
subtitles we add financial ratios. The purpose is to understand the financial 
performance and the shareholder independence of the bank. 
The first indicator is the Return on Average Assets (ROAA). This indicator measures the 
profitability of the assets of a firm. Regularly banks and other financial institutions use 
this indicator to show its performance. This ratio helps stakeholders to see how well 
the bank is converting the investments in assets into profits.ROAAwas used on annual 
basis and get the data of the last three years (2012, 2013, and 2014). 
ROAA = Net Income / Average Total Assets 
The second indicator is the Return on Average Equity (ROAE). It measures how 
effectively the bank is making profit from the invested equity in the bank. It’s 
considered effective for evaluating and comparing similar banks in same area. The 
average equity affords more precise indication of the profitability of the bank, mainly 
when the equity of the stockholder has changed considerably during the financial year. 
ROAE = Net Income / Average Stockholders' Equity 
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The third indicator is equity to total assets. This is considered a solvency ratio that 
measures the assets that are financed by owners' investments. This show us how much 
will the shareholder get after paying all liabilities.  It also shows how leveraged the 
bank is with debt. Banks with higher ratio prove new investors and creditors that 
current investors believe in the bank and are willing to finance it. This means that the 
bank is more sustainable and less risky to lend more. On the other hand, “people who 
run banks will always want to have less equity, because this enables them to get more 
upside when times are good, and they can rely on various forms of government 
downside support when decisions go wrong” (Simon Johnson, 2013). He also considers 
that it costs a lot for the rest of them if banks fund themselves with so much debt 
equity. This factor creates a weak and deformed financial system that doesn’t provide 
safe support to the economy. 
Equity Ratio= Total Equity / Total Assets 
The fourth indicator is net interest margin. It measures the difference between interest 
expense and interest return adjusted relative to the amount of interest-generating 
assets. This should not be puzzled with profitability. Banks have additional major 
returns from fees and service charges. This is not affected by interest margins. "In the 
United States, the average net interest margin for banks was 3.03% in the first quarter 
of 2015” (Sean Ross, 2015). However, this was the lowest average net interest margin 
in more than 10 years. The net interest margin for American banks during the first 
quarter of 2005 was 3.5%. A recent peak of 3.84% was reached in the first quarter of 
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2010. On the surface, this suggests that a typical net interest margin for American 
banks in the 21st century ranges between 3 and 4 %. 
Net Interest Margin = (Investment Returns - Interest Expenses) / Average Earning Assets 
The fifth indicator is the loan-to-deposit ratio (LTD). It is frequently used for assessing 
banks liquidity by dividing the banks loans by its funding and short term deposits. If this 
ratio is too high, it means that banks might not have sufficient liquidity to face 
unexpected fund necessities; if the ratio is too low, banks may be losing part of 
earnings.  
LTD = Net Loans / Deposits& ST Funding 
As the board of directors’ attributes, ownership structure and financial performance 
are converted into measurable numbers, the second step is to develop the hypothesis 
and report findings. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Hypotheses development 
 
Reference to the presented literature review and research methodology, the key goal 
of the thesis is to understand the actual status of the corporate governance in focus on 
the board of directors in the Lebanese banks above, present the situation numerically 
and analyses the index with financial performance. In order to deepen the study, banks 
are classified into: 
 local and foreign banks 
 ranking tiers according to total assets 
Also, BoD index is divided into three subgroups. 
4.1 Attributes Hypothesizes 
 
The fact that corporate governance is relatively a recent trend of attention from the 
Lebanese firms, it is still not considered a basic concentration for all banks 
management. It is expected that banks in Lebanon have comparatively low score on 
the BoD Index. Various banks in Lebanon do not consider BoD attributes a major 
concern. Some foreign banks and big banks in Lebanon increase the mean of this index. 
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Hypothesis 1: Less than half of banks in Lebanon have BoD index score above 
50% 
 
Foreign banks have higher chance to apply corporate governance standards. This 
statement would be strongly true if the banks are from advanced countries where 
corporate governance is essential part in the management system. However most of 
the foreign banks in Lebanon are based in Arabian countries. The awareness in the 
other Arabian countries regarding the importance of the corporate governance is even 
less than in Lebanon. Lebanon has been a unique case in the maturity of the good 
relationship with western countries.  
Banks with better ranking in terms of total assets are expected to be more aware to 
corporate governance standards. Often bigger banks are exposed more into 
international stakeholders who are concerned on having good standards. It is expected 
that bigger banks have higher BoD index. 
 Hypothesis 2 (a): Foreign banks have higher BoD index score than local ones 
 Hypothesis 2 (b): Banks with better ranking have higher BoD index score 
 
Board committees and characteristics are the main components of the BoD index. In 
Lebanon it is observed that banks have approximately good availability of audit and risk 
committees. This gives bigger and local banks opportunity to differentiate in these two 
components. 
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Hypothesis 3 (a): Bigger banks have higher committee and characteristics score 
Hypothesis 3 (b): Local banks have higher committee and characteristics score 
 
4.2 Financial Performance Hypothesizes 
 
In general, higher ranked banks are supposed to have higher returns. Banks with more 
assets have advanced opportunity in better results. It is expected that banks with more 
assets have higher profitability and liquidity ratios. However since the total assets are 
higher, the ROAA would get lower as the denominator in this case is increasing also. 
Equity to assets ratio is also expected to be lower as higher ranked banks depends 
more on their assets in terms of investments rather than equity. 
Local banks in Lebanon have more assets than foreign banks and are attainable to have 
higher returns. However foreign banks have more strict financial standards being 
subsidiaries to man offices abroad and thus may have higher liquidity and solvency 
ratios. 
 Hypothesis 4 (a): Higher ranked banks have higher financial indicators except in 
ROAA and Equity to Assets 
Hypothesis 4 (b): Local banks have higher profitability ratios and foreign banks 
have higher liquidity and solvency ratios. 
 
4.3 Attributes and Financial Performance Hypothesis 
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The key question in this thesis is to evaluate the efficiency of board of directors in 
terms of financial performance. Prior research finds positive relationship between 
corporate governance and financial performance. Research indicates that as banks 
invest more on well-structured BoD, independent CEO and good committees the bank 
is able to show more positive results than banks with same circumstances having less 
CG awareness. In Lebanon, It is expected to have a positive relationship between 
financial measurements (ROAA, ROAE, Equity to Assets, interest margin and LTD) and 
BoD index. Linear regression is applied to present this relation.  
 Hypothesis 5: BoD index affects positively financial performance.   
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Chapter Five 
 
Empirical Findings 
 
This section presents all empirical findings in attempt to give evidence that supports 
hypothesizes. 
5.1. Data Results 
 
Data results give a general overview for the total index, geographic indications and 
ranking classes. 
5.1.1. Primary Indications 
The total index score is 29 formed out of 18 attributes. The average score of the total 
population is 12.49 which represent 43%. Thirty three banks or 49% of the banks 
scored above 14 and ten banks scored above 20. The highest score was 26 counted for 
one bank and eight banks scored 0 due to total absence of disclosed information 
related to the study.  
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Table 1: Percemtage of banks in Lebanon with BoDindex above 15/29 
 
The above results give evidence that marginally supports Hypothesis 1. 
The average ROAA for the banks during last three years was 0.98. Returns of banks in 
Lebanon, was almost equal to their average assets. The average ROAE during the last 
three years was 8.7. The average equity to total assets during the same period was 
17.25. The interest margin for the banks was 3.5 and LTD was 36.6. In general average 
financial performance of banks is positive. Studying it in details is out of this thesis 
scope. 
Fourteen banks had a score A and B in the ownership structure, BvD indicator and 
thirty banks were unclassified. 
5.1.2. Geographic Indications 
A bank is considered to be foreign bank acting in Lebanon if the main office is abroad 
and the bank has a branch in Lebanon. The bank is Lebanese local one if the main office 
is in the country and it’s registered as Lebanese bank regardless if more than half of the 
shareholders or executives are foreigners. 
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Based on this definition there are 17 foreign banks acting in Lebanon. The average 
score of BoD index for the foreign banks is 14 and 12.1 for local banks. Three foreign 
banks and nine local ones mentioned almost nothing in terms of attributes under 
study. Four foreign banks and eleven local banks scored above 66% of the total index. 
Foreign banks have relatively the same BoD index as local banks. 
There are no enough evidence that supports Hypothesis 2 (a). The score of the foreign 
banks is higher slightly. 
The financial performance of the foreign banks differs from the local ones. The average 
ROAA of the foreign banks for the last three years is -0.3. Five banks recorded negative 
results at least one year and six banks did not disclose financial data. This implies that 
foreign banks in Lebanon are facing problems preventing from profit earnings. In the 
same period of time, average ROAA for the local banks in Lebanon is 1.3 and only two 
banks disclosed negative profits. The average ROAE for foreign is -0.25 while local 
banks average ROAE recorded 10.9. A big difference is noticed implying that foreign 
banks in Lebanon rely more than local banks on equity funding. Equity exceeds total 
assets 19.9 times for foreign banks and 16.5 times for local banks. Net interest margin 
average for foreign banks is 5.5 which is higher than the local banks average 3.0. LTD 
average for the two groups is close to each other.  
5.1.3. Ranking Indications 
In the purpose of understanding the situation more, banks are ranked reference to 
their total assets into four groups. First group represents the first tier and consists of 
30 
 
the top 15 banks. The second tier ranges from 16 to 37, the third tier ranges from 38 to 
7 and the fourth tier is named “other” due to missing data. 
The average score of BoD index for the first tier banks is 20.3. The second tier scored 
an average of 13.71 while the third tier mean is 6.19. Eight banks from the third tier 
mentioned very minimal information about the corporate governance. The non-ranked 
banks scored 11.8. It is noticed that better ranked banks tend to have higher score on 
the index.  
Presented results are considered strong evidence that supports Hypothesis 2 (b). 
The financial performance of the tiers differs among each other. The average ROAA of 
the first tier is 0.96, second tier is 0.76 and third tier is 1.2 while the fourth group 
scored irrelevant data. This implies that ranking per total assets cannot determine the 
financial profitability of the bank. The average ROAE for the first tier is 11.64 while the 
average of the second and third tier is 6.71 and 8.68 respectively.  
5.2. Factor Analysis 
In this section, the factor analysis is conducted to categorize the BoD index into four 
different categories. 
Table 2: Factor Analysis of all studies attributes 
Rotated Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 
AdtFirm  .803   
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AnRep  .709   
BoDExst  .809   
BoDDet .738    
NMCMPC .761    
CGC .635    
CRDTCOM     
RSKCOM .647    
BRDMBR  .880   
INDNPD  .730   
DUALCC    .831 
AVGAGE   .648  
FINEXP .660    
MNRTBD     
CGGDL .743    
MEET .741    
EXECCOM   .813  
 
Attributes factor analysis lead to the following classification. 
Board Characteristics: 
 Audit Firm 
 Annual Report Disclosure 
 Board of Directors Existence Disclosure 
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 Board of Directors: Number of members 
 Independent Members on Board 
Board Committees: 
 Board of Directors Details Disclosure 
 Nomination and Compensation Committee 
 Corporate Governance Committee 
 Board Risk Committee 
 Financial Experience of Members 
 Corporate Governance Guidelines 
 Number of Annual Meetings of Board 
Board Members Experience:  
 Average Age of Members 
 Board Executive Committee 
Duality: 
 Dual Chairman/CEO 
The statistical factor analysis can be studied and explained in terms of our 
understanding to the variables that constitute board of directors’ scores. 
5.2.1. Board Characteristics 
The board characteristics contain attributes that explain the essential disclosure of 
BoD. We find that as long as banks hire audit companies from the “Big Four”, it is 
common to find disclosed annual report mentioning board members. It is 
understandable that whenever bank hire professional auditor, there will be a disclosed 
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annual report on their website. We find that there is a positive relation between audit 
firms being dual and from the “big four” and having a board with suitable number of 
members. 
5.2.2. Board Committees 
Board committees contain the presence of different committees under BoD.  There is a 
positive link between the presence of the nomination and compensation committee, 
corporate governance committee and board risk committee. Lebanese banks tend to 
focus on having these three committees. This is a sign on the importance of the 
functions of these committees for the banks in Lebanon. Audit committee is present in 
41 banks (61.2%). Risk committee is present in 55.2% of banks. Nomination and 
compensation committee is present in 38.8% of banks. Corporate governance 
committee is present in 25.3% of banks. Executive credit committee is present in 19.4% 
of banks. Board executive committee is present in only 7 banks (10.4%).  
“The audit committee has a broad range of responsibilities: 
 Oversee financial reporting and disclosure 
 Monitor choice of accounting principles 
 Hire and monitor the external auditor 
 Oversee internal audit function 
 Oversee regulatory compliance 
 Monitor risk” (Larcker and Tayan, 2014) 
Responsibilities of the nominating and compensation committee include: 
 
 Appointing qualified members on board 
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 Selecting consultants when needed 
 Evaluating the board and CEO process 
 Setting guidelines for the compensation of the executives 
Responsibilities of corporate governance committee are assisting the BoD on:  
 The general approach to corporate governance of the bank 
 The size and structure of the Board and its committees 
 Related party transactions and other difficulties comprising conflicts of interest. 
Responsibilities of the board risk committee: 
 Recommends acceptable level of financial and operational risk appetite 
 Analyzes limits for individual types of financial and operational risk 
 Observe the financial and operational risk profile 
On the other hand, it’s noticed that executive credit committee and board executive 
committee is not positively correlated to the other committees.  
Responsibilities of the executive credit committee include: 
 Setting the parameters for all the levels of credit consent. 
 Revising loans that exceeds the limits set.  
 Improving the Credit Policy rules. 
Responsibilities of the executive committee include: 
 Developing and delivering bank strategy 
 Overseeing the quality of projects 
 Reviewing relevant issues before being considered by the board. 
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The study measures that in Lebanon credit responsibilities are managed by the 
executives of the bank and are discussed in the board. However, few banks decided to 
set a specialized committee for this purpose. Also the responsibilities of the executive 
committee are denoted usually for the CEO and the BoD. 
There is a positive relation between the three committees and the annual number of 
meetings. As the meetings per year increases, we can find the seriousness and the 
continuation process on the board. 
5.2.4. Board Experience 
Test shows that there is positive relationship between age of the directors and the 
presence of the board executive committee. As the age of the directors ranges 
between 50 and 70 years, we notice that more banks have executive committee. 
5.2.5. Duality 
The duality of chairman and CEO didn't fit in other categories and we classify it alone. 
5.3. Analysis of Variance Test 
 
Below the ANOVA test is presented for the BoD index and the subsidized groups.  
5.3.1. ANOVA Index per ranking 
Several analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted to determine whether there 
exists significant difference in the average of the attributes across ranking groups.  
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5.3.1.1. Board of Directors Index 
Table 3: Statistics results and ANOVA for BoD index reference to ranking groups 
Descriptive 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
BODINDX 1st Tier 15 20.07 3.127 .808 18.33 21.80 15 26 
2nd Tier 21 13.71 6.270 1.368 10.86 16.57 0 24 
3rd Tier 21 6.19 6.539 1.427 3.21 9.17 0 22 
Other 10 11.80 8.094 2.560 6.01 17.59 0 21 
Total 67 12.49 7.880 .963 10.57 14.41 0 26 
 
ANOVA 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
BODINDX Between Groups 1730.689 3 576.896 15.348 .000 
Within Groups 2368.057 63 37.588   
Total 4098.746 66    
 
Descriptive statistics give the average board of directors index (BODINDX) for each rank 
group along with the standard deviation and other statistics. 
The ANOVA table reveals that the test is highly significant (0.000), which indicates that 
there is a difference in the average BODINDX among the ranking groups. 
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The first tier which represents the top 15 banks in Lebanon has the highest mean of 
total attributes (20.07). The second tier has a score of 13.71. The fourth tier has a score 
of 11.8 and the third tier has a score of 6.19. Results are expected as larger banks tend 
to have higher awareness for the importance of corporate governance and process of 
applying BoD. 
Table 4: Post Hoc test for BoD index reference to ranking groups 
Multiple Comparisons 
Scheffe 
Dependent Variable (I) RnkGrp (J) RnkGrp 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
BODINDX 1st Tier 2nd Tier 6.352
*
 2.073 .032 .40 12.31 
3rd Tier 13.876
*
 2.073 .000 7.92 19.83 
Other 8.267
*
 2.503 .017 1.08 15.46 
2nd Tier 1st Tier -6.352
*
 2.073 .032 -12.31 -.40 
3rd Tier 7.524
*
 1.892 .003 2.09 12.96 
Other 1.914 2.356 .882 -4.85 8.68 
3rd Tier 1st Tier -13.876
*
 2.073 .000 -19.83 -7.92 
2nd Tier -7.524
*
 1.892 .003 -12.96 -2.09 
Other -5.610 2.356 .140 -12.38 1.16 
Other 1st Tier -8.267
*
 2.503 .017 -15.46 -1.08 
2nd Tier -1.914 2.356 .882 -8.68 4.85 
3rd Tier 5.610 2.356 .140 -1.16 12.38 
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The Post Hoc Test based on the Scheffe determines the multiple comparisons between 
different tiers. The average BODINDX in the first tier differs significantly in the other 
groups (all alpha significance are below 0.05). The significance of the second tier 
relevant to the first tier is 0.032 with average 6.35, the third tier is 0.00 with average of 
13.87 and the other is 0.017 with average of 8.26. 
The first tier relevant to the second tier is significant 0.032 with average -6.35 and the 
third tier is also significant with average of 7.52. 
The first tier relevant to the third tier is significant 0.00 with average -13.87 and the 
second tier is also significant 0.003 with average -7.52. 
The first tier relevant to the “other” group is significant 0.017 with average -8.26. 
In general this test proves that large banks in Lebanon apply more corporate 
governance standards focused on BoD than the smaller banks. 
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5.3.1.2. Board Committees 
Table 5: Statistics results and ANOVA for Board Committees subgroup index reference 
to ranking groups 
Descriptives 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
COMMT 1st Tier 15 .730230 .7798033 .2013444 .298389 1.162070 -.4744 2.2758 
2nd Tier 21 -.079531 1.1181037 .2439902 -.588486 .429424 -1.9763 2.4731 
3rd Tier 20 -.585344 .5895514 .1318277 -.861262 -.309425 -1.3309 1.2442 
Other 10 .242358 1.0169917 .3216010 -.485154 .969870 -1.2123 1.7130 
Total 66 .000000 1.0000000 .1230915 -.245831 .245831 -1.9763 2.4731 
 
ANOVA 
 Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
COMMT Between Groups 15.571 3 5.190 6.511 .001 
Within Groups 49.429 62 .797   
Total 65.000 65    
 
Descriptive statistics give the average board committees index (COMMT) for each rank 
group along with the standard deviation and other statistics. 
The ANOVA table reveals the test is significant (0.001) which indicates that there is a 
difference in the average COMMT among the ranking groups. 
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The first tier has the highest mean of committee attributes (0.73). The second tier has a 
score of -0.07 and the third tier has a score of -0.58. This means that top banks in 
Lebanon has highest score of committee attributes. 
Table 6: Post Hoc test for Board Committees subgroup reference to ranking groups 
Multiple Comparisons 
Scheffe 
Dependent Variable (I) RnkGrp (J) RnkGrp 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
COMMT 1st Tier 2nd Tier .8097606 .3018490 .076 -.057703 1.677224 
3rd Tier 1.3155735
*
 .3049771 .001 .439121 2.192026 
Other .4878714 .3645173 .619 -.559690 1.535433 
2nd Tier 1st Tier -.8097606 .3018490 .076 -1.677224 .057703 
3rd Tier .5058130 .2789723 .358 -.295907 1.307532 
Other -.3218891 .3430560 .830 -1.307774 .663996 
3rd Tier 1st Tier -1.3155735
*
 .3049771 .001 -2.192026 -.439121 
2nd Tier -.5058130 .2789723 .358 -1.307532 .295907 
Other -.8277021 .3458115 .137 -1.821506 .166102 
Other 1st Tier -.4878714 .3645173 .619 -1.535433 .559690 
2nd Tier .3218891 .3430560 .830 -.663996 1.307774 
3rd Tier .8277021 .3458115 .137 -.166102 1.821506 
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The average COMMT differs significantly among some groups.  The significance of the 
second tier relevant to the first tier is low 0.076 with average 0.8, the third tier is 0.01 
with average of 1.31 and the “other” is not significant 0.619 with average of 0.48. 
The first tier relevant to the second tier has low significance 0.076 with average -
0.8while the third and “other” are not significant (0.358 and 0.830 respectively) 
The first tier relevant to the third tier is significant 0.001 with average -1.31while the 
rest are not significant. 
The three tiers are not significantly related to the “other” tiers in terms of committee 
attributes. 
5.3.1.3. Board Characteristics 
Table 7: Statistics results and ANOVA for Board Characteristics subgroup index 
reference to ranking groups 
Descriptives 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CHARC 1st Tier 15 .556752 .5508210 .1422214 .251718 .861787 -.8235 1.2532 
2nd Tier 21 .286808 .9315613 .2032833 -.137234 .710850 -1.8279 1.4500 
3rd Tier 20 -.585217 1.1387407 .2546302 -1.118164 -.052270 -1.8699 1.2028 
Other 10 -.266991 .7317329 .2313943 -.790441 .256459 -1.8279 .5712 
Total 66 .000000 1.0000000 .1230915 -.245831 .245831 -1.8699 1.4500 
42 
 
 
ANOVA 
 Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
CHARC Between Groups 13.939 3 4.646 5.642 .002 
Within Groups 51.061 62 .824   
Total 65.000 65    
 
The ANOVA table reveals the test is significant (0.002) which indicates that there is a 
difference in the average board characteristics (CHARC) among the ranking groups. 
The first tier has the highest average of characteristics attributes (0.55). The second 
tier has a score of 0.28, the third tier has a score of -0.58 and the “other” tier has a 
score of -0.266. This means that top banks in Lebanon has highest score of board 
characteristics attributes. 
The above results are enough evidence to support Hypothesis 3 (a) significantly. 
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Table 8: Post Hoc test for Board Characteristics subgroup index reference to ranking 
groups 
Multiple Comparisons 
Scheffe 
Dependent Variable (I) RnkGrp (J) RnkGrp 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CHARC 1st Tier 2nd Tier .2699441 .3067912 .855 -.611722 1.151610 
3rd Tier 1.1419688
*
 .3099705 .006 .251166 2.032772 
Other .8237432 .3704856 .187 -.240970 1.888456 
2nd Tier 1st Tier -.2699441 .3067912 .855 -1.151610 .611722 
3rd Tier .8720247
*
 .2835399 .031 .057179 1.686871 
Other .5537991 .3486728 .477 -.448228 1.555826 
3rd Tier 1st Tier -1.1419688
*
 .3099705 .006 -2.032772 -.251166 
2nd Tier -.8720247
*
 .2835399 .031 -1.686871 -.057179 
Other -.3182256 .3514735 .844 -1.328301 .691850 
Other 1st Tier -.8237432 .3704856 .187 -1.888456 .240970 
2nd Tier -.5537991 .3486728 .477 -1.555826 .448228 
3rd Tier .3182256 .3514735 .844 -.691850 1.328301 
 
The average CHARC differs significantly among some groups.  There is no significance 
for the second and “other” tier relevant to the first tier (0.855 and 0.187 respectively); 
while the third tier is significantly (0.006) relevant to the first tier with average of 1.14. 
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The third tier relevant to the second tier has significant difference 0.031 with average 
0.87 while the first and “other” tiers are not significant. 
The first and second tiers are significantly different (0.006 and 0.031 respectively) with 
average of -1.14 and -0.87. 
5.3.1.4. Board Experience 
Table 9: Statistics results and ANOVA for Board Experience subgroup index reference to 
ranking groups 
Descriptives 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
EXPRC 1st Tier 15 .418358 1.6161045 .4172764 -.476611 1.313327 -1.0740 3.6340 
2nd Tier 21 -.075617 .7605278 .1659608 -.421805 .270571 -1.0570 1.9214 
3rd Tier 20 -.126935 .5944319 .1329190 -.405137 .151268 -1.1032 2.0522 
Other 10 -.214872 .8578934 .2712897 -.828572 .398828 -1.3689 1.2541 
Total 66 .000000 1.0000000 .1230915 -.245831 .245831 -1.3689 3.6340 
 
ANOVA 
 Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
EXPRC Between Groups 3.529 3 1.176 1.187 .322 
Within Groups 61.471 62 .991   
Total 65.000 65    
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The ANOVA table exposes that there is no significant (0.3222) difference in the average 
board experience (EXPRC) among the ranking groups. 
The first tier has the highest average of characteristics attributes (0.55). The second 
tier has a score of 0.28, the third tier has a score of -0.58 and the “other” tier has a 
score of -0.266. This means that top banks in Lebanon has highest score of board 
characteristics attributes. 
5.3.1.5. Ownership Structure 
Table 10: Statistics results and ANOVA for BvD Index reference to ranking groups 
Descriptives 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
BvDCat 1st Tier 15 3.27 1.335 .345 2.53 4.01 1 6 
2nd Tier 21 1.71 .956 .209 1.28 2.15 1 4 
3rd Tier 21 2.00 1.378 .301 1.37 2.63 1 6 
Other 10 1.10 .316 .100 .87 1.33 1 2 
Total 67 2.06 1.324 .162 1.74 2.38 1 6 
ANOVA 
 Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
BvDCat Between Groups 33.642 3 11.214 8.603 .000 
Within Groups 82.119 63 1.303   
Total 115.761 66    
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The ANOVA table states that there is significant (0.000) difference in the average of 
ownership structure (BvDCat) among the ranking groups. 
The first tier has the highest average of characteristics attributes (3.27). The third tier 
has a score of 2.00, then the second tier with a score of 1.71 and the “other” tier has a 
score of 1.10. This means that top banks in Lebanon has highest score in terms of 
independent ownership structure based on Bureau van Dijk Independence Indicator. 
Table 11: Post Hoc test for BvD Index reference to ranking groups 
Multiple Comparisons 
Scheffe 
Dependent Variable (I) RnkGrp (J) RnkGrp 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
BvDCat 1st Tier 2nd Tier 1.552* .386 .002 .44 2.66 
3rd Tier 1.267* .386 .018 .16 2.38 
Other 2.167* .466 .000 .83 3.51 
2nd Tier 1st Tier -1.552* .386 .002 -2.66 -.44 
3rd Tier -.286 .352 .883 -1.30 .73 
Other .614 .439 .584 -.65 1.87 
3rd Tier 1st Tier -1.267* .386 .018 -2.38 -.16 
2nd Tier .286 .352 .883 -.73 1.30 
Other .900 .439 .250 -.36 2.16 
Other 1st Tier -2.167* .466 .000 -3.51 -.83 
2nd Tier -.614 .439 .584 -1.87 .65 
3rd Tier -.900 .439 .250 -2.16 .36 
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Based on multiple comparisons, we notice a significant relation between the first tier 
and the other three tiers.  The average of the second tier relevant to the first tier is 
1.55, the third tier is 1.26 and the “other” tier is 2.16. 
The average BvDCat in the second tier differs significantly in the first tier (0.002) but 
doesn’t differ significantly in the third and “other” tier. 
The case is similar for the third and “other” tier. 
5.3.2. ANOVA Indicators per ranking 
Based on the same ranking, we analyze ANOVA to determine whether there exists 
significant difference in the average of the financial indicators across ranking groups. 
We dismiss the indicators where ANOVA shows no significant relationship. 
Table 12: ANOVA test for financial indicators reference to ranking groups 
ANOVA 
 Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
ROAA Between Groups 1.061 3 .354 .050 .985 
Within Groups 374.403 53 7.064   
Total 375.464 56    
ROAAm1 Between Groups .723 3 .241 .031 .992 
Within Groups 398.435 52 7.662   
Total 399.158 55    
ROAAm2 Between Groups 12.653 3 4.218 1.916 .141 
Within Groups 99.056 45 2.201   
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Total 111.709 48    
ROAE Between Groups 414.445 3 138.148 1.185 .324 
Within Groups 6178.117 53 116.568   
Total 6592.562 56    
ROAEm1 Between Groups 393.912 3 131.304 .991 .404 
Within Groups 6887.978 52 132.461   
Total 7281.891 55    
ROAEm2 Between Groups 1009.910 3 336.637 .511 .677 
Within Groups 29653.775 45 658.973   
Total 30663.686 48    
EqAst Between Groups 6818.143 3 2272.714 7.576 .000 
Within Groups 18899.047 63 299.985   
Total 25717.190 66    
EqAstm1 Between Groups 4313.712 3 1437.904 6.024 .001 
Within Groups 15037.701 63 238.694   
Total 19351.413 66    
EqAstm2 Between Groups 1544.772 3 514.924 2.567 .062 
Within Groups 12639.365 63 200.625   
Total 14184.136 66    
IntMar Between Groups 128.102 3 42.701 7.266 .000 
Within Groups 370.213 63 5.876   
Total 498.315 66    
IntMarm1 Between Groups 159.722 3 53.241 4.178 .009 
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Within Groups 802.872 63 12.744   
Total 962.594 66    
IntMarm2 Between Groups 66.189 3 22.063 3.799 .014 
Within Groups 365.864 63 5.807   
Total 432.053 66    
LnsDps Between Groups 6614.483 3 2204.828 6.433 .001 
Within Groups 21591.687 63 342.725   
Total 28206.171 66    
LnsDpsm1 Between Groups 6153.433 3 2051.144 5.848 .001 
Within Groups 22097.317 63 350.751   
Total 28250.749 66    
LnsDpsm2 Between Groups 7245.227 3 2415.076 1.223 .309 
Within Groups 124383.643 63 1974.344   
Total 131628.870 66    
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Equity to Assets 
Table 13: Statistics results for Equity to Assets ratio in reference to ranking groups 
Descriptives 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
EqAst 1st Tier 15 8.82407 1.431754 .369677 8.03119 9.61695 7.006 12.818 
2nd Tier 21 14.67548 10.802024 2.357195 9.75845 19.59250 .969 43.335 
3rd Tier 21 29.72852 28.534601 6.226760 16.73973 42.71732 4.985 99.995 
Other 10 1.67400 5.293653 1.674000 -2.11285 5.46085 .000 16.740 
Total 67 16.14306 19.739665 2.411584 11.32818 20.95794 .000 99.995 
EqAstm1 1st Tier 15 8.59713 1.289952 .333064 7.88278 9.31148 6.776 12.166 
2nd Tier 21 16.05990 14.604969 3.187065 9.41180 22.70801 .757 67.114 
3rd Tier 21 24.52010 22.904660 4.998207 14.09402 34.94617 .000 78.060 
Other 10 1.68600 5.331600 1.686000 -2.12800 5.50000 .000 16.860 
Total 67 14.89548 17.123178 2.091929 10.71881 19.07215 .000 78.060 
EqAstm2 1st Tier 15 8.21207 1.389142 .358675 7.44279 8.98135 6.379 11.192 
2nd Tier 21 15.53071 15.162944 3.308826 8.62862 22.43280 .000 64.499 
3rd Tier 21 13.49210 19.698527 4.298571 4.52543 22.45876 .000 83.680 
Other 10 1.67800 5.306302 1.678000 -2.11790 5.47390 .000 16.780 
Total 67 11.18567 14.659848 1.790986 7.60985 14.76149 .000 83.680 
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The ANOVA table reveals that there is strong significant difference in the Equity to 
Assets ratio among the ranking groups. The last year significance was 0.000 and the 
year before was 0.001.  
The first tier has the lowest average equity to asset ratio (8.82). The second tier has a 
ratio of 14.67, and the third tier has a ratio of 29.72. Results are against primary 
expectations but can be understood. Ranking are based on total assets, thus banks 
with larger assets will have less on this ratio. Also, large banks in Lebanon tend to 
depend on depositors on their investments rather on shareholders’ equity. 
Table 14: Post Hoc Tests results for Equity to Assets ratio in reference to ranking groups 
Multiple Comparisons 
Scheffe 
Dependent Variable (I) RnkGrp (J) RnkGrp 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
EqAst 1st Tier 2nd Tier -5.851410 5.855253 .802 -22.67100 10.96818 
3rd Tier -20.904457
*
 5.855253 .008 -37.72404 -4.08487 
Other 7.150067 7.070889 .796 -13.16152 27.46165 
2nd Tier 1st Tier 5.851410 5.855253 .802 -10.96818 22.67100 
3rd Tier -15.053048 5.345090 .057 -30.40716 .30107 
Other 13.001476 6.654583 .292 -6.11424 32.11719 
3rd Tier 1st Tier 20.904457
*
 5.855253 .008 4.08487 37.72404 
2nd Tier 15.053048 5.345090 .057 -.30107 30.40716 
Other 28.054524
*
 6.654583 .001 8.93881 47.17024 
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Other 1st Tier -7.150067 7.070889 .796 -27.46165 13.16152 
2nd Tier -13.001476 6.654583 .292 -32.11719 6.11424 
3rd Tier -28.054524
*
 6.654583 .001 -47.17024 -8.93881 
EqAstm1 1st Tier 2nd Tier -7.462771 5.222957 .567 -22.46605 7.54051 
3rd Tier -15.922962
*
 5.222957 .033 -30.92624 -.91969 
Other 6.911133 6.307319 .753 -11.20704 25.02931 
2nd Tier 1st Tier 7.462771 5.222957 .567 -7.54051 22.46605 
3rd Tier -8.460190 4.767885 .377 -22.15625 5.23586 
Other 14.373905 5.935969 .130 -2.67755 31.42536 
3rd Tier 1st Tier 15.922962
*
 5.222957 .033 .91969 30.92624 
2nd Tier 8.460190 4.767885 .377 -5.23586 22.15625 
Other 22.834095
*
 5.935969 .004 5.78264 39.88555 
Other 1st Tier -6.911133 6.307319 .753 -25.02931 11.20704 
2nd Tier -14.373905 5.935969 .130 -31.42536 2.67755 
3rd Tier -22.834095
*
 5.935969 .004 -39.88555 -5.78264 
EqAstm2 1st Tier 2nd Tier -7.318648 4.788377 .510 -21.07357 6.43627 
3rd Tier -5.280029 4.788377 .750 -19.03495 8.47489 
Other 6.534067 5.782514 .735 -10.07658 23.14471 
2nd Tier 1st Tier 7.318648 4.788377 .510 -6.43627 21.07357 
3rd Tier 2.038619 4.371170 .974 -10.51785 14.59508 
Other 13.852714 5.442063 .102 -1.77996 29.48539 
3rd Tier 1st Tier 5.280029 4.788377 .750 -8.47489 19.03495 
2nd Tier -2.038619 4.371170 .974 -14.59508 10.51785 
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Other 11.814095 5.442063 .205 -3.81858 27.44677 
Other 1st Tier -6.534067 5.782514 .735 -23.14471 10.07658 
2nd Tier -13.852714 5.442063 .102 -29.48539 1.77996 
3rd Tier -11.814095 5.442063 .205 -27.44677 3.81858 
 
The Post Hoc Test based on the Scheffe determines the multiple comparisons between 
different tiers. In the latest year, the average equity to total assets ratioin the first and 
second tier differs significantly in the third tier. The averages of the third tier relevant 
to the first and second one are -20.9 and -15. 
The first tier relevant to the third one is significant 0.032 with average -6.35 and the 
third tier is also significant with average of 7.52. 
In the previous year, the first and “other” tiers are significantly relevant to the third 
year with average of equity to assets 15.9 and 22.8 respectively. 
In the year before, there are no significant relations. 
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Interest Margin 
Table 15: Statistics results for Interest Margin ratio in reference to ranking groups 
Descriptives 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
IntMar 1st Tier 15 2.28073 .670694 .173172 1.90932 2.65215 .901 3.307 
2nd Tier 21 3.30609 3.110275 .678718 1.89031 4.72187 -1.532 13.980 
3rd Tier 21 4.18905 2.919243 .637031 2.86022 5.51787 .000 12.816 
Other 10 .00000 .000000 .000000 .00000 .00000 .000 .000 
Total 67 2.85983 2.747768 .335693 2.18960 3.53007 -1.532 13.980 
IntMarm1 1st Tier 15 2.26233 .551159 .142309 1.95711 2.56756 1.278 3.079 
2nd Tier 21 3.20576 3.202264 .698791 1.74811 4.66342 -1.210 13.799 
3rd Tier 21 4.69995 5.447613 1.188767 2.22023 7.17968 .000 24.537 
Other 10 .00000 .000000 .000000 .00000 .00000 .000 .000 
Total 67 2.98440 3.819000 .466565 2.05288 3.91593 -1.210 24.537 
IntMarm2 1st Tier 15 2.34000 .377090 .097364 2.13117 2.54883 1.678 3.110 
2nd Tier 21 2.88186 2.486906 .542687 1.74983 4.01388 .000 10.884 
3rd Tier 21 2.84233 3.465395 .756211 1.26490 4.41976 -.019 11.426 
Other 10 .00000 .000000 .000000 .00000 .00000 .000 .000 
Total 67 2.31803 2.558565 .312578 1.69395 2.94211 -.019 11.426 
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The ANOVA table states that there is significant relationship in the Interest Margin 
ratio among the ranking groups. The last year significance was 0.000 and the year 
before was 0.009 and the one before was 0.014 
The first tier has the lowest Interest Margin in the last two years (2.2). The second tier 
has a ratio of 3.2 and the third tier has a ratio of 4. As in the equity to total assets, 
results are against primary expectations but can be understood. As mentioned above, 
this margin should not be puzzled with profitability. Banks have additional 
majorreturns from fees and service charges.Large banks in Lebanon do not account for 
profit due to higher interest margin. There are other factors that engine this difference. 
Loans to Deposits 
Table 16: Statistics results for LTD ratio in reference to ranking groups 
Descriptives 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
LnsDps 1st Tier 15 35.78353 9.859059 2.545598 30.32377 41.24330 21.426 54.271 
2nd Tier 21 34.55876 14.298510 3.120191 28.05016 41.06737 11.998 65.070 
3rd Tier 21 30.29905 25.291328 5.519020 18.78657 41.81152 .000 90.150 
Other 10 6.10000 19.289894 6.100000 -7.69916 19.89916 .000 61.000 
Total 67 29.25025 20.672838 2.525589 24.20775 34.29276 .000 90.150 
LnsDpsm1 1st Tier 15 35.73127 10.073994 2.601094 30.15248 41.31006 20.663 54.835 
2nd Tier 21 32.15343 16.633556 3.629739 24.58192 39.72493 8.276 66.676 
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3rd Tier 21 31.01400 24.134889 5.266665 20.02793 42.00007 .000 83.476 
Other 10 6.23000 19.700990 6.230000 -7.86324 20.32324 .000 62.300 
Total 67 28.72813 20.689168 2.527584 23.68165 33.77462 .000 83.476 
 
The ANOVA table exposes that there is significant relations in the Equity to Assets ratio 
among the ranking groups. The last year significance was 0.001 and the year before 
was 0.001.  
The first tier has the highest average LTD (35.7). The second tier has a ratio of 32.1, and 
the third tier has a ratio of 31.0. Results are the same in the last two years. Data 
discrepancy is minimal. This shows that banks in Lebanon share similar strategy for 
loans and deposits ratio. 
In summary, the results indicate the following: 
 There is no significant difference in ROAA and ROAE among ranking tiers. 
 Equity Assets and Interest margin are higher as ranking is lower. 
 LTD ratio is positively related to ranking.  
Hypothesis 4 (a) has no enough evidence for support. 
5.3.3. ANOVA Index per Country 
As mentioned previously, banks are divided into two groups. Local banks have their 
headquarters in Beirut and are registered as Lebanese companies while foreign banks 
have their main office outside Lebanon and operating through branches in the country. 
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Table 17: ANOVA for BvD Index, Bod Index and subgroups relevant to country 
ANOVA 
 Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
BODINDX Between Groups 51.766 1 51.766 .831 .365 
Within Groups 4046.980 65 62.261   
Total 4098.746 66    
BvDCat Between Groups 2.852 1 2.852 1.642 .205 
Within Groups 112.909 65 1.737   
Total 115.761 66    
COMMT Between Groups .128 1 .128 .127 .723 
Within Groups 64.872 64 1.014   
Total 65.000 65    
CHARC Between Groups .290 1 .290 .287 .594 
Within Groups 64.710 64 1.011   
Total 65.000 65    
EXPRC Between Groups .641 1 .641 .638 .428 
Within Groups 64.359 64 1.006   
Total 65.000 65    
 
The Anova index shows that there is no significant relationship between local and 
foreign banks in terms of BoD index, BvD index and the subgroups. 
Hypothesis 3 (b) is not proofed to be true. 
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5.3.4. ANOVA Indicators per Country 
Based on the same ranking, we analyze ANOVA to determine whether there exists 
significant difference in the average of the financial indicators across the country 
origin. We dismiss the indicators where ANOVA shows no significant relationship. 
Table 18: ANOVA for BvD Index, Bod Index and subgroups relevant to ranking 
ANOVA 
 Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
ROAA Between Groups 39.763 1 39.763 6.515 .014 
Within Groups 335.702 55 6.104   
Total 375.464 56    
ROAAm1 Between Groups 36.385 1 36.385 5.416 .024 
Within Groups 362.773 54 6.718   
Total 399.158 55    
ROAAm2 Between Groups 3.163 1 3.163 1.369 .248 
Within Groups 108.547 47 2.310   
Total 111.709 48    
ROAE Between Groups 443.067 1 443.067 3.963 .051 
Within Groups 6149.495 55 111.809   
Total 6592.562 56    
ROAEm1 Between Groups 314.166 1 314.166 2.435 .125 
Within Groups 6967.725 54 129.032   
Total 7281.891 55    
ROAEm2 Between Groups 3653.292 1 3653.292 6.357 .015 
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Within Groups 27010.393 47 574.689   
Total 30663.686 48    
EqAst Between Groups 136.928 1 136.928 .348 .557 
Within Groups 25580.262 65 393.542   
Total 25717.190 66    
EqAstm1 Between Groups 4.947 1 4.947 .017 .898 
Within Groups 19346.466 65 297.638   
Total 19351.413 66    
EqAstm2 Between Groups 67.487 1 67.487 .311 .579 
Within Groups 14116.650 65 217.179   
Total 14184.136 66    
IntMar Between Groups 4.071 1 4.071 .535 .467 
Within Groups 494.245 65 7.604   
Total 498.315 66    
IntMarm1 Between Groups 8.572 1 8.572 .584 .448 
Within Groups 954.022 65 14.677   
Total 962.594 66    
IntMarm2 Between Groups .732 1 .732 .110 .741 
Within Groups 431.321 65 6.636   
Total 432.053 66    
LnsDps Between Groups 1227.469 1 1227.469 2.957 .090 
Within Groups 26978.701 65 415.057   
Total 28206.171 66    
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LnsDpsm1 Between Groups 1249.859 1 1249.859 3.009 .088 
Within Groups 27000.890 65 415.398   
Total 28250.749 66    
LnsDpsm2 Between Groups 2923.369 1 2923.369 1.476 .229 
Within Groups 128705.501 65 1980.085   
Total 131628.870 66    
 
ROAA 
ANOVA test indicates that there is a significant relationship between local and foreign 
banks regarding ROAA in the last two years. 
Table 19: Statistics results for ROAA in reference to country. 
Descriptives 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum 
Maximu
m Lower Bound Upper Bound 
ROAA Lebanese 46 1.32204 1.206550 .177896 .96374 1.68034 -1.096 5.166 
Foreign 11 -.79436 5.198005 1.567258 -4.28643 2.69770 -15.976 2.521 
Total 57 .91361 2.589348 .342967 .22657 1.60066 -15.976 5.166 
ROAAm1 Lebanese 45 1.24722 1.585953 .236420 .77075 1.72370 -2.296 8.364 
Foreign 11 -.78164 5.020976 1.513881 -4.15477 2.59150 -15.482 2.492 
Total 56 .84870 2.693959 .359995 .12725 1.57014 -15.482 8.364 
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Descriptive statistics state that average ROAA for Lebanese banks around is 1.3 in the 
last two years, while average ROAA for foreign banks is around -0.7 in the same period. 
Several reasons justify this difference. Lebanese banks transact in Lebanese Lira which 
charge higher interests than USD. Local banks also have additional services that can be 
offered. They can give housing loans (Iskan), student loans and other services restricted 
on foreign banks. The central bank had over liquidity and offered the Lebanese banks 
facilities to support the economy cycle. It's also noted that the local banks have less 
restrictions than foreign banks that are connected with main office. Other factors may 
also support the discrepancy. 
ROAE 
ANOVA test shows that there is a marginal significant difference among local and 
foreign banks regarding ROAE in the last year (0.051) and the year 2012 (0.015).  
Table 20: Statistics results for ROAE in reference to country. 
Descriptives 
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum 
Maximu
m 
Lower 
Bound Upper Bound 
ROAE Lebanese 46 10.54839 9.147620 1.348743 7.83188 13.26490 -17.056 44.097 
Foreign 11 3.48364 15.440019 4.655341 -6.88911 13.85638 -21.963 29.282 
Total 57 9.18502 10.850084 1.437129 6.30610 12.06393 -21.963 44.097 
ROAEm2 Lebanese 39 11.28556 8.198358 1.312788 8.62796 13.94316 .114 45.208 
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Foreign 10 -10.13880 52.128363 16.484436 -47.42918 27.15158 -155.442 22.563 
Total 49 6.91324 25.275023 3.610718 -.34659 14.17308 -155.442 45.208 
 
According to the above statistics the mean of ROAE for local banks in 2014 is 10.54 and 
in 2012 is 11.28. The ROAE for foreign banks in 2014 is 3.48 and in 2012 is -10.13. 
There is a big difference in ROAE between the two groups. Justification is similar to 
what was mentioned in ROAA. 
Loans to Deposits 
ANOVA reveals marginal significant relationship between the two groups in terms of 
LTD ratio for the last two years. 
Table 21: Statistics results for LTD ratio in reference to country 
Descriptives 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum 
Maximu
m Lower Bound Upper Bound 
LnsDps Lebanese 50 31.74604 19.708968 2.787269 26.14481 37.34727 .000 90.150 
Foreign 17 21.90971 22.283647 5.404578 10.45251 33.36690 .000 61.000 
Total 67 29.25025 20.672838 2.525589 24.20775 34.29276 .000 90.150 
LnsDpsm1 Lebanese 50 31.24658 18.927781 2.676792 25.86736 36.62580 .000 83.476 
Foreign 17 21.32094 24.297771 5.893075 8.82818 33.81370 .000 62.300 
Total 67 28.72813 20.689168 2.527584 23.68165 33.77462 .000 83.476 
LnsDpsm2 Lebanese 50 33.86046 49.660732 7.023088 19.74704 47.97388 .000 336.572 
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Foreign 17 18.68053 22.167364 5.376375 7.28312 30.07794 .000 66.100 
Total 67 30.00884 44.658446 5.455898 19.11578 40.90189 .000 336.572 
In the last three years Lebanese banks had an average of 32.3 on LTD ratio while 
foreign banks had an average of 20.4.  
In summary: 
 Profitability ratios are higher for local banks. This supports hypothesis 4(b) 
 No significant difference in Equity to assets and Interest Margin between local 
and foreign banks 
 Liquidity (LTD ratio) is higher for local banks than foreign ones 
Hypothesis 4 (b) is partially proved to be true. The liquidity part in hypothesis is 
rejected. 
5.4. Linear Regression Analysis 
Using SPSS, we generate the relationship between the subgroups, total index and 
ownership structure with the financial performance. Ratios of 2014 are used to 
construct regression model with financial indicators as dependent variables and BoD 
index (or it’s subgroups), BvD category, country location and ranking group as 
independent variables. 
5.4.1. ROAA 
Table 22: Linear regression with ROAA independent variable 
Model Summary 
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Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .446
a
 .199 .137 2.405040 
a. Predictors: (Constant), RnkGrp, Cntry, BvDCat, BODINDX 
 
 
ANOVA
a
 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 74.685 4 18.671 3.228 .019
b
 
Residual 300.779 52 5.784   
Total 375.464 56    
a. Dependent Variable: ROAA 
b. Predictors: (Constant), RnkGrp, Cntry, BvDCat, BODINDX 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .121 1.708  .071 .944 
BODINDX .079 .060 .243 1.330 .189 
BvDCat .345 .264 .182 1.309 .196 
Cntry -3.022 .943 -.465 -3.206 .002 
RnkGrp 1.224 .581 .394 2.108 .040 
a. Dependent Variable: ROAA 
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When ROAA is considered as dependent variable, regression model was highly 
significant (F= 3.228 and P-Value= 0.019) as shown in the ANOVA table. The model 
explains acceptable R square value 0.199. The model revealed that country and ranking 
are significant coefficients.  The country coefficient -3.022 indicates that the difference 
in ROAA between two banks having the same BoD index and BvD category when one is 
Lebanese and the other is foreign. The ROAA index is 3.022 higher for Lebanese banks.  
The ROAA is also higher for lower ranked groups. This can be justified since the ranking 
is based on total assets value, which stands for the denominator in the presented ratio. 
So as the ranking goes higher, the denominator becomes bigger. 
5.4.2.ROAE 
Table 23: Linear Regression with ROAE as independent variable 
ANOVA
a
 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 626.153 6 104.359 .858 .533
b
 
Residual 5963.274 49 121.699   
Total 6589.427 55    
 
ANOVA test shows no significant results for linear regression when compared with BoD 
index, BvD category, country origin and ranking.  
5.4.3. Equity to Assets 
For Equity to Assets ratio, ANOVA test applied stepwise regression method backward. 
The test showed no significant results. 
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Table 24: Linear Regression with Equity to Assets as independent variable 
ANOVA
a
 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1515.736 4 378.934 .971 .430
b
 
Residual 24201.454 62 390.346   
Total 25717.190 66    
a. Dependent Variable: EqAst 
b. Predictors: (Constant), RnkGrp, BvDCat, Cntry, BODINDX 
5.4.4Interest Margin 
Applying stepwise regression method backward, the model is marginally significant 
(0.066) after countryand ranking are omitted. 
Table 25: Linear Regression with Interest Margin as independent variable 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
3 .285
c
 .081 .053 2.674582 
c. Predictors: (Constant), BvDCat, BODINDX 
ANOVA
a
 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
3 Regression 40.498 2 20.249 2.831 .066
d
 
Residual 457.817 64 7.153   
Total 498.315 66    
a. Dependent Variable: IntMar 
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d. Predictors: (Constant), BvDCat, BODINDX 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
3 (Constant) 2.656 .697  3.810 .000 
BODINDX -.081 .046 -.233 -1.775 .081 
BvDCat .592 .272 .285 2.172 .034 
 
BvD Category is significant in this model. As the bank has more independent ownership 
structure, the interest margin is higher by 0.592. As the bank has higher score on the 
board of directors index, the interest margin is lower by 0.81. This negative result falls 
against expectations for the relationship between BoD attributes and financial 
performance.  
5.4.5. LTD 
Table 26: Linear Regression with LTD as independent variable 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .430
a
 .185 .132 19.258151 
     
a. Predictors: (Constant), BODINDX, Cntry, BvDCat, RnkGrp 
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ANOVA
a
 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 5211.834 4 1302.959 3.513 .012
b
 
Residual 22994.336 62 370.876   
Total 28206.171 66    
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 40.764 11.205  3.638 .001 
BvDCat 2.939 2.060 .188 1.427 .159 
Cntry -1.785 6.837 -.038 -.261 .795 
RnkGrp -6.234 3.516 -.301 -1.773 .081 
BODINDX -.035 .400 -.013 -.088 .930 
 
When LTD is considered as dependent variable, regression model was significant (F= 
3.513 and P-Value= 0.012) as shown in the ANOVA table. The model explains 
acceptable R square value 0.185. The model revealed that ranking is significant 
coefficient. The ranking coefficient -6.234 indicates that the difference in LTD between 
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two local or foreign banks having the same BoD index and BvD category when one is 
ranked higher than the other. 
In summary of the above: 
 There is no significant relationship between ROAA, ROAE, Equity to Assets, 
interest margin and LTD with BoD index.  
 Local banks have higher financial performance than foreign banks despite the 
fact that foreign banks have slightly  better BoD index 
 Better ranked banks have higher LTD ratios but lower ROAA. Other financial 
performance are not significantly related 
There are no enough evidence to support Hypothesis 5 
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Chapter Six 
 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis describes the status of the corporate governance practices applied in 
Lebanese banks especially in board of directors. The study used 18 attributes driven 
from International Shareholder services QuickScore and combined with Bureau van 
Dijk indicators. These attributes were combined to form an index that measures 
corporate governance in the banks. Then this index was analyzed in details in relation 
with financial performance of the banks. The thesis concludes that there is no 
consistency in the disclosure of Board of Directors mechanisms made by banks in 
Lebanon. Although most of the banks disclose their corporate governance practices, 
the study revealed many them do not abide by international standards. The disclosed 
information about board members, committees and roles are minimal. This makes it 
difficult to judge that actual situation and propose necessary corrections. In fact, the 
test revels that half of the banks in Lebanon apply have minimal application for BoD 
international standards and less than quarter of the total banks have independent 
ownership structure.  
Based on the index created in this thesis there is no empirical evidence that banks in 
Lebanon applying BoD standards referred by ISS have better financial performance. 
Opposite to the expectations, the test is not enough to support most of hypothesizes 
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that corporate governance with the presented attributes affect the financial 
performance positively. Various interpretations explain this relation. The application of 
corporate governance is still preliminary in the Lebanese banks; actual results will 
appear on long term. Also central bank in Lebanon supports banks to raise their 
financial performance, despite the fact they are protected well. The secrecy financial 
system is considered as an attraction for foreign investments who seek benefits from 
this system regardless the governance situation. 
The study concludes slightly better CG index in foreign banks than local ones. However, 
this better position didn’t lead the foreign banks to have better financial results. Local 
banks in Lebanon have better financial indicators than foreign banks. This negative 
relationship can be interpreted. Local banks have the right to lend the central bank 
while foreign banks are forbidden. This gives local banks higher chance for profitable 
and less risky investments. Lebanese banks transact in Lebanese Lira which charge 
higher interests than USD. Local banks also have additional services that can be offered 
like housing loans…  The central bank support Lebanese banks with monetary facilities 
to immune the economy cycle. It's also noted that the local banks have less restrictions 
than foreign banks that are connected with main office. Other factors may also support 
the discrepancy.  
Finally, it is a fundamental issue to improve corporate governance position in Lebanon, 
but a realistic view should encounter the regional situation. Lebanese economy has 
been passing in harsh period since 2011 surrounded by political strains, security 
challenges, and neighborhood crisis, especially in Syria.  In fact, the pillars of the 
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Lebanese economy and monetary inflow have decreased steadily since the beginning 
of the Arab spring in 2011. Tourism, investments, and international trades were 
affected negatively. The national debt increased by 10% and is more than the GDP by 
143%. These negative consequences are expected to continue with worse scenarios. 
The banking sector was able in all of these difficulties to remain solid recording, a 
growth of 7% with total assets of more than USD 175 billion at the beginning of 2015. 
All these challenges make it crucial for government to set regulations and build legal 
enforcement that ensures good corporate governance application. 
6.1 Limitations and recommendations for further research 
Data is limited to the information that appears in bank’s website, annual report and 
corporate governance publications. No meetings with banking expertise were done in 
this study. Such meetings add value to the understanding of the actual situation, 
preventing obstacles and future plans for improvement. 
The study was limited to part of board of director’s attributes. Future studies can 
continue deeper in BoD details and to cover corporate social responsibility, 
committees’ work, ownership structure, risk mitigation and IT governance. Attributes 
were driven by ISS review. There are additional score boards driven by other 
institutions in this domain. 
Financial performance was studied through five financial ratios that cover profitability, 
liquidity and solvency. Financial performance can be studied more intensely by 
covering balance sheet, income statement and cash-flow figures and ratios. Aside from 
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financial ratios, there are measurements that analyze conservatism measurements. For 
example, Basu coefficient is an important measurement for the asymmetric verifiability 
of profits and losses. The PIN is another important measurement for information 
asymmetry. 
The thesis analyzed the efficiency of BoD in respect to financial performance. Similar 
studies to be conducted to compare BoD attributes applied in Lebanon with 
international standards and attributes of other countries. Comparison can be done 
with countries having similar circumstances such as UAE and Egypt or with countries 
having best governance practices as ideal case.   
The thesis analyzed the efficiency of BoD in respect to financial performance. Similar 
studies to be conducted to compare BoD attributes applied in Lebanon with 
international standards and attributes of other countries. Comparison can be done 
with countries having similar circumstances such as UAE and Egypt or with countries 
having best governance practices as ideal case.  
  
74 
 
References 
Adams, R., & Ferreira, D. (2009).Women in the boardroom and their impact on 
governance and performanceâ˜†.Journal Of Financial Economics, 94(2), 291-309. 
Aebi, V., Sabato, G., &Schmid, M. (2011).Risk management, corporate governance, and 
bank performance in the financial crisis. Journal of Banking & Finance, 3213-3226. 
Aggarwal, R., Erel, I., Stulz, R., & Williamson, R. (2007).Differences in governance 
practices between U.S. and foreign firms: Measurement, causes, and consequences. 
Cambridge, MA: NBER.  
Barth, M., Beaver, W., & Landsman, W. (1996). Value-Relevance of Banks' Fair Value 
Disclosures under SFAS No. 107. The Accounting Review, 71(4), 513-537. 
Cabo, R., Gimeno, R., & Nieto, M. (2011).Gender Diversity on European Banks’ Boards 
of Directors. Journal of Business Ethics, 145-162. 
Chahine, S., &Safieddine, A. (2008).Corporate governance and the external monitoring 
of banks in Lebanon. Corporate Governance, 8(3), 258-270 
Chahine, S., &Safieddine, A. (2009). Is corporate governance different for the Lebanese 
banking system? Journal of Management & Governance, 207-226. 
Christopher L. Pass, Stephen F. Witt, (1985) "Financial Institutions, Corporate Control 
and Financing",Managerial Finance, Vol. 11 Iss: 3/4, pp.61 - 72 
Chunga, K. H., Edler, J., & Kim, J. (2007).Corporate Governance and Liquidity.School of 
Management, State University of New York (SUNY) at Buffalo Buffalo, NY 14260, 
USA. 
Cloyd, M. A. (n.d.). Taking a Fresh Look at Board Composition. Retrieved from 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/09/09/taking-a-fresh-look-at-board-
composition/PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 
Core, J., Holthausen, R., &Larcker, D. (1999). Corporate governance, chief executive 
officer compensation, and firm performance1The financial support of Nomura 
Securities and Ernst & Young LLP is gratefully acknowledged. Journal Of Financial 
Economics, 51(3), 371-406. 
Denis, D., & McConnell, J. (2003).International Corporate Governance.Journal of 
Finance and Quantitative Analysis,38(1), 1-36. 
Diane K. Denis & John J. McConnell (2003).International Corporate Governance.The 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Vol. 38 No. 1pp 1-36 
75 
 
Edwards, J., &Nibler, M. (n.d.). Corporate governance in Germany: The role of banks 
and ownership concentration. Economic Policy, 237-267. 
El Meouchi, S., & Haydar, O. (n.d.). Law in the Middle East (LIME). Retrieved May 03, 
2016, from http://www.lawinthemiddleeast.com/topic_detail.php?country=8  
El-Kassar, A., Elgammal, W., & Bayoud, M. (2014). Effect of internal audit function on 
corporate governance quality: Evidence from Lebanon. Internal Journal Corporate 
Governance, 5 (1/2), 103-117. doi: 10.1504/IJCG.2014.062349 
El-Kassar, A., Messarra, L. C., & Elgammal, W. (2015). Effects of ethical practices on 
corporate governance in developing countries: evidence from Lebanon and 
Egypt. Corporate Ownership & Control, 12 (3), 494-504. Retrieved 
from www.virtusinterpress.org 
Fahlenbrach, R., &Stulz, R. (2011). Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis. Journal Of 
Financial Economics, 99(1), 11-26 
Fahlenbrach, R., Low, A., &Stulz, R. (2010). Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside 
directors.Journal Of Financial Economics, 97(1), 12-32. 
Ferreira, D., Ferreira, M., &Raposo, C. (2011).Board structure and price 
informativenessâ˜†.Journal Of Financial Economics, 99(3), 523-545. 
Francis, J., Khurana, I., & Pereira, R. (2005).Disclosure Incentives and Effects on Cost of 
Capital around the World. The Accounting Review, 8(4), 1125-1162. 
ISS Governance QuickScore 2.0 Overview and Updates. (2014). Institutional 
Shareholder Services Inc, 1-76.  
Ivashina, V., Nair, V., Saunders, A., Massoud, N., & Stover, R. (2009).Bank Debt and 
Corporate Governance.Review of Financial Studies,22(1), 41-77. 
James E. McNulty , Aigbe Akhigbe (2015), Toward a Better Measure of Bank Corporate 
Governance, in Kose John , Anil K. Makhija , Stephen P. Ferris (ed.) International 
Corporate Governance (Advances in Financial Economics, Volume 18) Emerald 
Group Publishing Limited, pp.81 - 124 
Jean Shaoul, Anne Stafford, Pam Stapleton, (2010) "Financial black holes: The 
disclosure and transparency of privately financed roads in the UK", Accounting, 
Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 23 Iss: 2, pp.229 - 255 
Johnson, S. (2013). Higher Bank Equity Is in the Public Interest. Retrieved April 02, 
2016, from http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-03-03/why-higher-bank-
equity-is-in-the-public-interest  
76 
 
Karlyn Mitchell , (2015) "Bank dependency and banker directors", Managerial Finance, 
Vol. 41 Iss: 8, pp.825 - 844 
Larcker, D. F., &Tayan, B. (n.d.).FINANCIAL REPORTING & EXTERNAL AUDIT.Corporate 
Governance Research Initiative.Retrieved March 27, 2016, from 
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/publication-pdf/cgri-quick-guide-10-
financial-reporting-external-audit.pdf. 
Leuz, C., Lins, K., & Warnock, F. (2010). Do Foreigners Invest Less in Poorly Governed 
Firms.ReviewOf Financial Studies, 23(3), 3245-3285 
Leventis, S., Dimitropoulos, P., &Owusu-Ansah, S. (2013). Corporate Governance and 
Accounting Conservatism: Evidence from the Banking Industry. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 21(3), 264-286 
Macey, J., & Hara, M. (2003).The Corporate Governance of Banks. Economy Policy 
Review,9(1). 
Margaret McCabe, Margaret Nowak, (2008) "The independent director on the board of 
company directors",Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 23 Iss: 6, pp.545 - 566 
Millar, C., Eldomiaty, T., Choi, C., & Hilton, B. (2005). Corporate Governance And 
Institutional Transparency In Emerging Markets. Journal of Business Ethics, 163-174. 
Mishra, C., & Nielsen, J. (2000).Board Independence and Compensation Policies in 
Large Bank Holding Companies.Financial Management,29(3), 51-51. 
Mohamed Belkhir, (2009) "Board of directors' size and performance in the banking 
industry", International Journal of Managerial Finance, Vol. 5 Iss: 2, pp.201 - 221 
Mullineux, A. (2006). The corporate governance of banks. Journal of Financial 
Regulation and Compliance, 14(4), 375-382. 
Opromolla, G. (2008). The new Italian Banking Regulation concerning banks' 
organization and corporate governance. Journal of Investment Compliance,9(2), 50-
54. 
Palvia, A., Vahamaa, E., &Vahamaa, S. (2014). Are Female CEOs and Chairwomen More 
Conservative and Risk Averse? Evidence from the Banking Industry During the 
Financial Crisis. Journal of Business Ethics. 
Peni, E., &Vähämaa, S. (n.d.). Did Good Corporate Governance Improve Bank 
Performance during the Financial Crisis? Journal of Financial Services Research, 19-
35. 
77 
 
Richard Molz, (1985) "BOARD OF DIRECTORS: The Role of the Board of Directors: 
Typologies of Interaction", Journal of Business Strategy, Vol. 5 Iss: 4, pp.86 - 93 
Ross, S. (2015). What net interest margin is typical for a bank? | Investopedia. 
Retrieved April 02, 2016, from 
http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/061715/what-net-interest-margin-
typical-bank.asp  
Ruth W. Epps, Tariq H. Ismail, (2009) "Board of directors' governance challenges and 
earnings management",Journal of Accounting & Organizational Change, Vol. 5 Iss: 3, 
pp.390 - 416 
Slomka-Golebiowska, A. (2012). Bankers on boards as corporate governance 
mechanism: Evidence from Poland. Journal of Management & Governance. 
Stapledon, G. (1996). Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance. The 
Journal of Finance, 53(2), 806-808. 
Subrahmanyam, V., Rangan, N., & Rosenstein, S. (1997). The Role of outside Directors 
in Bank Acquisitions. Financial Management, 26(3), 23-23 
Varekamp, D. (2013, June 24). The effect of good corporate governance on stock 
returns in the Netherlands.  
Wahlen, J. (1994). The Nature of Information in Commercial Bank Loan Loss 
Disclosures.The Accounting Review, 69(3), 455-478. 
Yassin, N., Ghanem, M. G., & Rustom, L. (2012). The role of internal audit function in 
corporate governance: An empirical study on commercial banks in Lebanon. Paper 
Presented at the proceedings of the academic and business research institute 
conference, Orlando. Retrieved from 
http://www.aabri.com/OC2012Proceedings.html 
 
  
78 
 
Appendix A – Complete List of Banks 
 
79 
 
 
  
 
80 
 
Appendix B – Average Results of BoD Attributes 
 
BoDAttributes Average 
BoD Index 12.49 
Audit firm 2.07 
Disclosed annual report 0.61 
BoD Existence 0.82 
BoD Details 0.45 
Audit Committee 0.61 
Nominating and Compensation Committee 0.39 
Corporate Governance Committee 0.25 
Executive Credit Committee 0.19 
Board Risk Committee 0.55 
Board Executive Committee 0.10 
BOD members 1.46 
Number of Independent member 2.28 
Dual Chairman/CEO 0.39 
Average age 0.25 
Financial Expertise on Board 0.72 
Minority on Board 0.54 
Corporate Governance guidelines 0.40 
Number of meetings per year 0.39 
BvD Category D 
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Appendix C – Average Results of Financial Indicators 
 
Financial Indicators Average 
ROAA last year 0.91 
ROAA last year -1 0.85 
ROAA last year -2 1.21 
ROAE last year 9.19 
ROAE last year -1 9.78 
ROAE last year -2 6.91 
Equity / Tot Assets last year 18.65 
Equity / Tot Assets last year -1 17.51 
Equity / Tot Assets last year -2 15.29 
Net Interest Margin last year 3.42 
Net Interest Margin last year -1 3.70 
Net Interest Margin last year -2 3.38 
Net Loans / Dep& ST Funding last year 35.00 
Net Loans / Dep& ST Funding last year -1 34.37 
Net Loans / Dep& ST Funding last year -2 41.03 
Total Assets last year (Million USD) 3993.57 
 
